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CIVIL RIGHTS LAW—EXCESSIVE FORCE
FOUND WHEN TASING SECTION 12 PATIENT,
POLICE OFFICER GRANTED QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY—GRAY V. CUMMINGS, 917 F.3D 1 (1ST
CIR. 2019).
Law enforcement’s use of excessive force is a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.1 In Gray v. Cummings,2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit determined whether a police officer could be
held civilly liable for tasing a mentally ill person who resisted arrest after
she had been involuntarily committed.3 The court held that there were no
claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and
that the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity, despite his use of
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4
On May 2, 2013, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Judith Gray (“Gray”)
was admitted to Athol Memorial Hospital after experiencing a manic episode and calling 9-1-1.5 She was admitted to the hospital pursuant to Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 123, § 12, a statute authorizing state agents to involuntary
hospitalize individuals at risk of serious harm by reason of mental illness.6
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . shall
not be violated . . . .”); see also Aaron Sussman, Comment, Shocking the Conscience: What Police Tasers and Weapon Technology Reveal About Excessive Force Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1342,
1344-50 (2012) (detailing excessive force through taser usage); When Using a Taser is Excessive
Force, HG.ORG LEGAL RESOURCES, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/when-using-a-taser-isexcessive-force-40805 (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (explaining excessive force in context of taser
use).
2 917 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019).
3
See id. at 5 (reviewing lower court’s issue).
4 See id. at 9, 13 (affirming lower court’s decision). The court also noted that it fairly balanced the competing concerns of the rights of the disabled and the importance of police not being
“unduly hampered in the performance of their important duties.” Id. at 20.
5 See id. at 6 (explaining circumstances of Gray’s hospitalization). Gray stated that “she ‘really [didn’t] know what happened’ . . . because she ‘was in a full-blown manic phase.’” Id. at 5.
The court elicited many of the facts from Cummings’s account because Gray had no memory of
the event. Id. at 6; see also Harriman v. Hancock Cnty., 627 F.3d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding
no factual dispute possible when plaintiff had no memory); Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062,
1065 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding police’s version of events “unrefuted” when plaintiff had no
memory).
6 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 5 (commenting on plaintiff’s mental state); see also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (West 2019) (authorizing involuntary hospitalization). Section 12 authorizes involuntary emergency restraint and hospitalization of persons posing risk of serious
harm by reason of mental illness. See § 12. The individual must be involuntarily committed by a
physician or a police officer for a period not exceeding three days:
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Gray escaped from the hospital later that morning, and hospital staff called
the police to request that “‘a section 12 patient’ – be ‘picked up and
brought back.’”7 Officer Cummings (“Cummings”) responded and spotted
Gray walking barefoot less than a quarter mile from the hospital.8 Cummings got out of his police cruiser and told Gray that she had to return to
the hospital while Gray used profanities and declared that she was not going back to the hospital.9 Cummings subsequently followed Gray until she
stopped, clenched her fists and teeth, flexed her body, and swore at Cummings while walking towards him.10
Cummings grabbed Gray’s shirt and took her to the ground after he
felt her body continue to move toward him.11 Once on the ground, Cummings repeatedly told Gray to put her hands behind her back and warned
that she would be tased if she did not comply.12 Instead, Gray continued to
swear at him—and when Cummings made one last request for her to comply—Gray refused to listen.13 Ultimately, Cummings arrested Gray after
he “removed the cartridge from his [t]aser, placed it in drive-stun mode,
and tased Gray’s back for four to six seconds.”14

Any physician . . . who, after examining a person, has reason to believe that failure to
hospitalize such person would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental
illness may restrain or authorize the restraint of such person and apply for the hospitalization of such person for a 3-day period at a public facility . . . .
Id. Prior to committing the patient to a public facility, “the applicant shall . . . communicate with
a facility to describe the circumstances and known clinical history and to determine whether the
facility is the proper facility to receive such person . . . .” Id.
7 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 6 (discussing how Gray absconded from hospital).
8 See id. (exploring Cummings’ method in attempting to detain Gray).
9 See id. (explaining Cummings’ attempt to initially detain Gray). Cummings implored Gray
to go back to the hospital on numerous occasions, all of which were met with profanity and Gray
eventually walking away from him. Id.
10
See id. (detailing escalation of situation that led to Gray’s arrest).
11 See id. (exploring how Cummings detained Gray). Additionally, the court noted that
“Cummings had a distinct height and weight advantage: he was six feet, three inches tall and
weighed 215 pounds, whereas Gray was five feet, ten inches tall and weighed 140 pounds.” Id.
12 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 6 (explaining course of events that led to Gray’s eventual arrest).
“She did not comply. Instead, she ‘tucked her arms underneath her chest and flex[ed] tightly,’
swearing all the while.” Id.
13 See id. (showing Gray’s refusal to obey Cummings’s commands). Additionally, Gray told
Cummings to “do it” in response to Cummings’s warning that she would be tased. Id.
14 See id. at 6-7 (detailing culmination of events leading to arrest). Following the taser deployment, Gray allowed Cummings to handcuff her. Id. at 7. Cummings then “helped Gray to
her feet and called an ambulance, which transported Gray to the hospital.” Id. Gray also mentioned that she felt “pain all over” and “must have passed out because [she] woke up in Emergency.” Id.; see also Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, When Does Use of Taser Constitute Violation of
Constitutional Rights, 45 A.L.R. 6th 1-2 (2020) (explaining taser use and effect of drive stun
mode on subject).
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Charges were filed against Gray for assaulting a police officer, resisting arrest, disturbing the peace, and disorderly conduct; however, the
charges were all subsequently dropped.15 Shortly thereafter, Gray sued
Cummings and the Town of Athol (“the Town”) in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title
II of the ADA, and supplemental state-law claims for assault and battery,
malicious prosecution, and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.16 Cummings and the Town filed a summary judgment motion, and a magistrate
judge found that: (1) neither Cummings nor the Town violated the Fourth
Amendment under § 1983, (2) that there were no viable state-law claims,
and (3) that there had been no abridgement of the ADA because Cummings
was entitled to employ an “appropriate level of force in response to an ongoing threat.”17 The magistrate judge also noted that Cummings was enti-

A taser may also be used as a drive stun or contact stun when the darts from a taser are
removed and the taser is placed in direct contact with the subject and then electricity is
cycled through. In other words, the electricity goes directly from the taser to the subject
without the conduit of wires.
Zitter, supra note 14, at 1-2.
[C]ritics have asserted that although coroners and officials have routinely found other
causes for deaths occurring shortly after a tasering . . . many persons have died as the
result of tasering by police, many of whom were unarmed, and that the cause was the
tasering . . . [f]urthermore, human rights organizations are concerned about the lack of
legislation or significant regulation in this area.
Zitter, supra note 14, at 1-2; Shaun H. Kedir, Note, Stunning Trends in Shocking Crimes: A Comprehensive Analysis of Taser Weapons, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 357, 363-64 (2007) (presenting debate
regarding taser safety).
Several of the medical studies, however, questioned the safety of Tasers on individuals
with mitigating health factors, such as illicit drug or alcohol abuse, preexisting heart
disease, pacemakers, and pregnancy. Some medical experts involved in the research
speculated that individuals with these underlying health problems might be more susceptible to cardiac arrest and recommended further research on the issue. Although
none of the research concluded that Taser in and of itself causes death, some studies
listed Taser as a contributory cause.
Kedir, supra note 14, at 363-64.
15 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 7 (listing charges filed against Gray).
16 See id. at 4, 7. (describing initiation of civil action). The district court referred the motion
to a magistrate judge, who in turn suggested that the motion be granted. Id.; see also Kedir, supra
note 14, at 368 (“The [§ 1983] claim is independent of, and in addition to, other common law tort
actions, such as assault and battery.”)
17
See Gray, 917 F.3d at 7 (finding no violation on any claim Gray brought against Cummings).
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tled to qualified immunity as a police officer.18 The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision and found
(1) that Gray did not have a claim under Title II of the ADA and (2) that
Cummings was entitled to qualified immunity, even though a jury could
have found there was excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.19
Congress enacted § 1983 in 1871 to supply a right of action against
a person, “who, under color of any statute . . . depriv[es] [another] of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws . . . .”20 A police officer violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights when the officer uses excessive force to arrest said person.21 The
Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor decided that courts must use a totality
of the circumstances approach—now commonly known as the “Graham
factors”—to make an excessive force determination.22 These factors include: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the
suspect was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.23

18 See id. (concluding no abridgment of ADA). The magistrate judge further noted that
Cummings was entitled to use that amount of force “regardless of Gray’s disability.” Id.
19 See id. at 7, 20 (noting holding of case-in-chief).

[T]his is a hard case – a case that is made all the more difficult because of two competing concerns: our concern for the rights of the disabled and our concern that the police
not be unduly hampered in the performance of their important duties . . . [w]e think
that our ruling today . . . satisfies this exacting standard.
Id. at 20.
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (detailing rights of action for people who have been deprived
rights); see also David P. Stoelting, Comment, Qualified Immunity for Law Enforcement Officials
in Section 1983 Excessive Force Cases, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 243, 244 (1989) (summarizing § 1983
and qualified immunity for police officers). Police officers are never granted absolute immunity;
instead, they are entitled to qualified immunity so “long as the officer’s conduct did not violate
the plaintiff’s ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.’” Stoelting, supra note 20, at
243-44.
21 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (showing need to balance government’s
interests and individual’s rights). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703
(1983)).
22 See id. at 396 (explaining reasonableness standard for excessive force claims). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).
23 See id. (outlining specific factors courts use to determine reasonableness).
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Even when excessive force is found, police officers and other government officials still have the defense of qualified immunity, which provides protection from civil damages for actions taken under color of state
law.24 To invoke the qualified immunity defense, a government official
must first show that their actions did “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”25 Secondly, they must prove “the allegedly abridged right was not
‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s claimed misconduct.”26
The second prong of the analysis has two facets, the first of which requires
the plaintiff to “identify either ‘controlling authority’ or a ‘consensus of
cases of persuasive authority’ sufficient to send a clear signal to a reasona-

Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving –
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.
Id. at 396-97 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d. Cir. 1973)); see also Estate of
Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 899 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding first Graham factor
cuts in plaintiff’s favor absent any crime). “When the subject of a seizure ‘ha[s] not committed
any crime, this factor weighs heavily in [the subject’s] favor.” Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 899 (quoting Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 743-44 (4th Cir. 2003)). For example, Estate of Armstrong
v. Vill. of Pinehurst details a case where a bipolar and schizophrenic person left a hospital after
being involuntarily committed, was subsequently found by police officers, and tased for not releasing from the four-by-four post. Id. at 895. The court analyzed the first Graham factor as favoring Armstrong because he had not committed any crime. Id. at 899-900. The second and
third Graham factors weigh more favorably toward the police officer since Armstrong had the
possibility of running into the street and endangering others or himself after resisting arrest. Id. at
901. While two out of the three Graham factors tipped the scale more heavily toward the police
officer, the court held that the police officer—although entitled to use some force—was not entitled to use the taser in the manner that he did under the circumstances. Id.
24 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding government officials shielded
from liability for unknowingly violating statutory or constitutional rights); see also Stoelting, supra note 20, at 247 (explaining qualified immunity analysis).
25 See Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150, 154 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818) (explaining qualified immunity standard). “[T]he doctrine’s prophylactic sweep is broad.
We view claims of qualified immunity through the lens of objective reasonableness. So viewed,
only those officials who should have known that their conduct was objectively unreasonable are
beyond the shield of qualified immunity and, thus, are vulnerable to the sword of liability.” Id. at
154; see also City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2019) (analyzing objectively
reasonable officer and unlawfulness of actions). In stressing the importance of the reasonable
person analysis, the Court stated that “[w]hile there does not have to be a case directly on point,
existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular [action] beyond debate.” City of
Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 504.
26
See Conlogue, 906 F.3d at 155 (quoting McKenney v. Mangino, 873 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir.
2017)) (noting requirements of second prong).
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ble official that certain conduct falls short of a constitutional norm.”27 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “an objectively reasonable official
in the defendant’s position would have known that their conduct violated
that rule of law.”28
As of May 2013, Estate of Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, Parker
v. Gerrish, and Ciolino v. Gikas were the most directly related cases to the
case-in-chief.29 The plaintiff in Armstrong, a bipolar and paranoid schizophrenic, left the hospital after being committed and was subsequently found
by police officers wrapped around a four-by-four post.30 Armstrong was
tased five times in drive stun mode after being warned that he would be
tased, and the court found that since the law was “not so settled at the time
[April 2011] they acted such that ‘every reasonable official would have understood that’ tasing Armstrong was unconstitutional” under the circumstances.31 In Parker, the plaintiff also originally resisted arrest; however,
even though he eventually complied, he was still tased.32 The Parker court
held that a jury could have found that the police officer violated the Fourth
Amendment by tasing an unarmed suspect who “presented no significant
‘active resistance’ or threat.”33 Lastly, Ciolino involved a police officer
who grabbed the plaintiff and forced him to the ground without giving any
warning; ultimately, the court held that because “[the plaintiff] was not
given a chance to submit peacefully to arrest before significant force was

See Alfano v. Lynch, 847 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2017) (examining first facet of second
prong); see also Ciolino v. Gikas, 861 F.3d 296, 305-06 (1st Cir. 2017) (showing more measured
approach could have been taken before throwing person to ground); Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 90708 (holding “right not to be subjected to tasing while offering stationary and non-violent resistance to a lawful seizure” not clearly established); Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 695
F.3d 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding qualified immunity applied to officer when suspect died
from taser); Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2008) (showing taser use after failure to be
arrested properly was excessive force); Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004)
(examining police officer’s taser use against noncompliant individual not outlier).
28 See Alfano, 847 F.3d at 75 (detailing second facet of second prong).
29 See Ciolino, 861 F.3d at 305-06 (holding officer not entitled to qualified immunity when
throwing individual to ground for little reason); Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 899 (finding officer entitled to qualified immunity when tased mentally ill individual multiple times); Parker, 547 F.3d at
11 (holding taser use was excessive force when suspect presented no active resistance or threat).
30 See Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 896 (detailing facts of Armstrong).
31 See id. at 908 (noting court ruling of established caselaw).
32 See Parker, 547 F.3d at 5 (showing relevant caselaw). The defendant was stopped for
suspicion of driving while intoxicated after speeding. Id. at 3. It is disputed as to whether the
defendant actually complied, but the court was required to defer to the defendant due to the posture of the case. Id. at 4-5.
33 See id. at 10 (examining holding of case). The court also notes that a jury could turn to the
facts about the “strong incapacitating effect of the taser and the fact that the South Portland Police
Department considered the [t]aser just below deadly force in its ‘continuum’ of force.” Id.
27
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used . . . an ‘objectively reasonable police officer’ would have taken a more
measured approach.”34
In Gray v. Cummings, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit narrowly addressed the question of excessive force and the application of qualified immunity in Gray’s case.35 In addressing the first
prong in the analysis, the appeals court held that Cummings violated
Gray’s Fourth Amendment rights through his use of excessive force.36
When applying the first Graham factor—the severity of the crime at issue—the court stated that because Gray had not committed any crime, the
scale tipped in Gray’s favor.37 The appeals court then held that the second
Graham factor—whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others—also cut in Gray’s favor because Gray posed a
danger only to herself because she was bipolar and experiencing a manic
phase.38 However, the appeals court held that the third Graham factor—
whether Gray was actively resisting arrest—favored Cummings; ultimately,

34 See Ciolino, 861 F.3d at 304 (quoting Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2010))
(holding Fourth Amendment violated when not given chance to submit peacefully).
35 See Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019) (stating holding of case-in-chief).

This appeal arises at the intersection of constitutional law and disability-rights law. It
touches upon a plethora of important issues. Some of these issues relate to the appropriateness of a police officer’s use of a Taser in attempting to regain custody of a mentally ill person who, after being involuntarily committed, absconded from a hospital . . .
In the end, we decide the case on the narrowest available grounds and affirm the entry
of summary judgment for the defendants.
Id.
See id. at 8-9 (examining holding of excessive force against Cummings). Conversely, the
magistrate judge held that a reasonable jury could not have found that Cummings violated Gray’s
Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Id. at 8.
37 See id. at 9 (applying first Graham factor). Unlike the magistrate judge’s assessment that
this factor cut in favor of Cummings, the appeals court stated:
36

[T]his assessment is insupportable: it fails to view the facts in the light most favorable
to Gray . . . we think it [is] important that Cummings was not called to the scene to investigate a crime; he was there to return a person suffering from mental illness to the
hospital.
Id. at 8. The appeals court also stated that the alleged assault does not tilt the scales because “a
reasonable jury could find that the facts did not support the characterization of Gray’s actions as
an ‘assault.’” Id. at 9.
38 See id. at 9 (analyzing second Graham factor). The magistrate judge held that the second
Graham factor favored Cummings because the definition of a § 12 patient entails a finding by a
qualified medial professional that the “failure to hospitalize would create a likelihood of serious
harm by reason of mental illness.” Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12(a) (West
2019)). Additionally, Cummings knew of this fact. Id. The appeals court differed in opinion,
holding that a reasonable jury could find that “Gray – who was shuffling down the sidewalk barefoot and unarmed – only posed a danger to herself.” Id.
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the Graham factors “point in conflicting directions” and did not provide a
clear answer.39 When assessing all three of these factors under the totality
of the circumstances, the appeals court held that a reasonable jury could
have found that Cummings used excessive force.40
In response to Cummings’s qualified immunity defense, the appeals court held that Gray’s right to be free from the degree of force used
was not clearly established at the time of the incident.41 The court further
stated that “an objectively reasonable police officer in May of 2013 could
have concluded that a single use of the [t]aser in drive-stun mode to quell a
nonviolent, mentally ill individual resisting arrest, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.”42 The appeals court also acknowledged the many
cases cited by Ms. Gray, but stated that no such case was factually similar
to her own.43 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held

39 See id. (discussing third Graham factor and noting factors point in conflicting directions).
The appeals court agreed with the magistrate judge in holding that the final Graham factor favored Cummings. Id. The court came to this conclusion because Cummings told Gray to put her
hands behind her back on numerous occasions and she subsequently refused to do so. Id.
40
See Gray, 917 F.3d at 9 (concluding reasonable jury could have found Cummings used
excessive force). “Drawing those inferences beneficially to Gray and aware that Cummings not
only had her down on the ground but also outweighed her by some seventy-five pounds, a reasonable jury could find that Gray had committed no crime and that she posed no threat to Cummings when he tased her.” Id.
41 See id. at 10 (restating qualified immunity two-prong inquiry). The court held that the first
prong of the qualified immunity analysis, whether the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, had been met. Id. However, they went on to state that the second prong, whether
Gray’s right to be free from the degree of force used, had not been clearly established at the time
of the incident. Id. at 10-12; see also Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 829 (9th Cir. 2010)
(showing force to be used differs with mentally ill persons).

The government has an important interest in providing assistance to a person in need of
psychiatric care; thus, the use of force that may be justified by that interest necessarily
differs both in degree and in kind from the use of force that would be justified against a
person who has committed a crime or who poses a threat to the community.
Bryan, 630 F.3d at 829.
42 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 12 (analyzing whether there was controlling authority sufficient to
send clear signal to police officer existed). The district court concluded that “the right not to be
tased while offering non-violent stationary, resistance to a lawful seizure was not clearly established at the time of the confrontation between Ms. Gray and Officer Cummings.” Id. at 10.
43 See id. at 13 (distinguishing case-in-chief from other cases). The appeals court noted that
the case on which Gray most relied, Parker, was factually dissimilar to the case-in-chief because
Gray never complied with Cummings’s command to put her hands behind her back. Id. at 12.
The appellate court also stated that Ciolino was readily distinguishable from the case-in-chief because “Cummings repeatedly told Gray that she needed to return to the hospital, and she adamantly refused to obey.” Id. The court noted that Gray’s argument of “passive” rather than “active”
resistance was flawed. Id. Additionally, there had been no subsequent taser deployments in this
case, and therefore none of the cases in which multiple deployments were made were applicable.
Id.; see also Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 733-34 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting no deploy-
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that although there had been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, nevertheless, Cummings had qualified immunity due to a lack of factually similar caselaw.44
The court attempted to weigh the values of two important competing concerns: the rights of the disabled, and not hampering police officers
in the performance of their duties.45 However, the court did not place
enough emphasis on the rights of the disabled and how these rights play a
role in analyzing a qualified immunity defense.46 The court incorrectly disregarded Gray’s illness and its role in the qualified immunity defense analysis; instead, the court played off Cummings’ ignorance as forgivable under the circumstances.47 Although it is true that the “skimpiness of [the]
information” would lead the police officer to prepare for the worst, this
should neither be an excuse nor a solution for similar, future problems.48
Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit did not
place enough emphasis on existing caselaw.49 Like Armstrong in Estate of
ment of taser subsequent to an initial taser); Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 859-63
(7th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging no deployment of taser subsequent to initial taser shock).
44 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 12 (stating holding of case-in-chief).
45 See id. at 20 (noting need to balance rights of mentally ill and protection of police officers
executing duties). “We add only that this is a hard case – a case that is made all the more difficult
because of two competing concerns: our concern for the rights of the disabled and our concern
that the police not be unduly hampered in the performance of their important duties.” Id.
46 See id. at 12 (showing court placed some emphasis on factor of disability). Although the
court stated that “a subject’s mental illness is a factor that a police officer must take into account
in determining what degree of force, if any, is appropriate,” it did not adequately balance the
rights of both parties. Id. at 11. Rather, the court was lenient with Cummings’s failure to consider Gray’s condition, reasoning that there was skimpy information. Id. at 12.
47 See id. at 12 (criticizing weight placed on mental illness in factor analysis); see also Estate
of Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 900 (4th Cir. 2016) (showing differing level of
force needed for disabled individuals). “Mental illness, of course describes a broad spectrum of
conditions that does not dictate the same police response in all situations. But ‘in some circumstances at least,’ it means that ‘increasing the use of force may . . . exacerbate the situation.’”
Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 900 (quoting Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001));
Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 829 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining differing level of force
needed).
48 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 11-12 (suggesting possible solution not fully discussed). One potential solution not discussed by the court is giving police officer more information about the individual upon dispatch, such as telling him or her what kind of disease from which the person may
be suffering from. Id. at 9; seem also Johnny Rice II, Why We Must Improve Police Responses to
Mental Illness, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://www.nami.org/Blogs/NAMI-Blog/March-2020/Why-We-Must-Improve-PoliceResponses-to-Mental-Illness (explaining how increasing police training can develop better
knowledge and tools to address these situations). Similarly, providing training on how to interact
with a person with mental illness can significantly improve officer response and trust. See Rice,
supra note 48.
49 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 11 (distinguishing relevant caselaw as outlier); see also Ciolino v.
Gikas, 861 F.3d 296, 305-06 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding no qualified immunity for police officer);
Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 906 (noting reasonable jury could find officers violated Armstrong’s
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Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, Gray did not comply with commands from
police while experiencing an episode due to his mental illness.50 Similarly,
Armstrong and Gray were both told that if they did not comply, they would
be tased.51 The court differentiated both Parker and Ciolino by stating that
Gray had ample opportunity to comply with Cummings’s commands.52
However, the amount of force used in this situation was clearly excessive,
especially as it was used on a mentally ill person.53 Given that the facts of
Armstrong, Ciolino, and Parker were so similar to those in Gray, the court
was mistaken in its finding that there was no controlling authority sufficiently available to show that the police officer’s conduct would fall short
of a constitutional norm.54
Although Gray was unable to find relief with any of her claims, future litigants with cases of similar factual bases may have better opportunities for success.55 Since the court decided that Cummings violated Gray’s
Fourth Amendment rights, future litigants could successfully bring a §
1983 claim, notwithstanding an asserted qualified immunity defense.56
Although this will not give Gray the damages she deserved, this adjudication will strengthen the body of law as future cases will be able to point to
controlling authority.57 Practitioners will now be able to cite Gray as controlling precedent that demonstrates what acts can constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation.58
In Gray v. Cummings, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
decided whether a police officer could be held liable for tasing a mentally
Fourth Amendment rights); Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding police officer used excessive force).
50 See Armstrong, 810 F.3d at 897 (showing similar facts to case-in-chief).
51 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 11. (explaining similarities between Gray and Armstrong).
52 See id. at 12-13 (examining how court differentiates between Gray and other cases); see
also Ciolino, 861 F.3d at 306 (distinguishing from case-in-chief); Parker, 547 F.3d at 10 (differentiating amount of time given to comply).
53 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 11-13 (balancing need to arrest versus amount of force used against
mentally ill person); see also Parker, 547 F.3d at 10 (discussing taser use and excessive force).
The court in Parker also points to the fact that tasers were listed just below deadly force in its
continuum of force. Parker, 547 F.3d at 10.
54 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 11-13. (disagreeing with case-in-chief regarding lack of controlling
authority).
55 See id. at 10 (reiterating second facet of “identify either ‘controlling authority’ or ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ sufficient to send a clear signal to a reasonable official that
certain conduct falls short of the constitutional norm.”).
56 See id. (quoting City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 U.S. 500, 504 (2019)) (“Taken together, these steps normally require that, to defeat a police officer’s qualified immunity defense, a
plaintiff must ‘identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to
have violated the Fourth Amendment.’”)
57
See id. at 11-13 (developing body of caselaw for disabled persons).
58 See id. at 9 (noting which acts will elicit finding of violation).
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ill individual in flight from the hospital to which she had been involuntarily
committed. Although the court attempted to weigh competing concerns, it
did not give enough weight to the rights of the disabled and mentally ill.
Additionally, the court could have placed more emphasis on existing
caselaw to give Gray a remedy against Cummings. Although there is a
need to make sure police officers are not unduly hampered in their duties;
here, the police officer’s use of a taser was an unreasonable action given
the circumstances.
Brandon Vallie

